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AN ILLINOIS CHOICE: FOSSIL LAW OR AN ACTION
FOR PROMISSORY FRAUD?
Michael J. Polelle*
Fossil law, while it has historical interest, must not be allowed to outlive
its utility. If synchronizing the law with the state of society is result-oriented,
then the courts need to be result-orientedand should not hesitate to depart
from a rule whose origin is obscure and whose meaning has been forgotten. This is evolution rather than devolution.1
It is axiomatic that a fraud action 2 may be based on misstatements of
past or present material facts when the other elements of the tort, such as
scienter, intent to induce, justifiable reliance, actual damage, and causation
are present.' Pure speculation or prognostication typically is held insufficient to satisfy the misrepresentation-of-fact requirement 4 because both
forewarn a plaintiff that reliance on the statement's veracity must be guarded;

* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. A.B., Loyola University, Chicago; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; LL.M., John Marshall Law School. The author is indebted to Phyllis
Haskin, J.D., John Marshall Law School, for her research assistance.
I. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 95 Ill. App. 3d 444, 445, 420 N.E.2d 209, 216 (4th Dist.
1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
2. The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation has five essential elements: (1) a false representation or willful omission of a material fact; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) an intention to induce
reliance; (4) action taken in reliance on the representation; and (5) consequent and proximate
injury. For cases involving the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, see, e.g., Howard v. Riggs
Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 706 (App. D.C. 1981); Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding
Club, Ltd., 403 So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Fla. App. 1981); Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho
113, 123, 504 P.2d 386, 394 (1972); Grefe v. Ross, 231 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Iowa 1975).
3. See, e.g., George William Hoffman & Co. v. Capital Serv. Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 487,
495, 428 N.E.2d 600, 606 (lst Dist. 1981) (absence of evidence sufficient to support allegations
of fraud required reversal of judgment); Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72
Ill. App. 3d 37, 45, 390 N.E.2d 393, 401 (lst Dist. 1979) (directed verdict for defendant erroneous because evidence supported prima facie case of fraud).
4. See, e.g., Ziskin v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 106 I1. App. 3d 482, 435 N.E.2d 1227 (lst
Dist. 1982) (stockholder not liable for mistaken belief that merger would result in increased
profitability); People v. Kinion, 104 I1. App. 3d 30, 432 N.E.2d 363 (3rd Dist. 1982) (attorney's statements regarding representation of accused without charging the accused a fee did
not estop him from later accepting court-ordered and state-paid compensation for his services);
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 4 I1. App. 3d 975, 283 N.E.2d 62 (1st Dist. 1972)
(mortgage creditor who failed to perfect his lien after being told that debt would be paid off
when property was sold, had no cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation); 3700 S.
Kedzie Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago Steel Foundry Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 483, 156 N.E.2d 618 (1st
Dist. 1959) (property buyer who was told that his taxes would remain the same had no cause
of action for fraudulent misrepresentation); see also James and Gray, Misrepresentation-Part
II, 37 MD. L. REv. 488, 502 (1978) ("A distinction should be made between predictions of
external events not within the speaker's control and statements about what he himself will do
in the future, i.e., promises and statements of his own intention."). For a recognition of this
distinction in Illinois law, see Kusiciel v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 106 Ill. App. 3d 333, 435 N.E.2d
1217 (lst Dist. 1982).
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even where the element of scienter exists, the statement objectively negates
any justifiable reliance. Similarly, mere opinion typically is nonactionable
in fraud because the very nature of a vague, indefinite, or puffing opinion,
with its manifest lack of certitude, should forestall plaintiff's reliance.'
As early as the nineteenth century, English courts recognized that every
statement, no matter how futuristic or opinionated, irreducibly contains the
kernel of a factual assertion. The courts specifically recognized that a promisor represents as fact at the time of the promise, the present intent to
do something in the future to fulfill the promise. Thus, the English judiciary
determined that the assertion of a promise which one does not intend to
fulfill is a sufficient factual misrepresentation on which to base an action
of fraud.'
In the seminal case of Edginton v. Fitzmaurice,' Lord Bowen considered
the case of an investor who bought debentures in a company in reliance
on certain representations of the company's directors. The directors
represented in the prospectus that any money raised by the sale of the debentures would be used to expand the facilities of the business and to buy new
equipment.' The directors, however, did not intend to expend the capital
in such a manner when they drafted and published the prospectus. 9 Instead,
they planned to use the proceeds from the sale of the debentures to pay
off other debts.'" Holding the directors liable to the investor for fraud, Lord
Bowen articulated the common law principle that established the law of promissory fraud. This common law principle was derived from the same insight as that used contemporaneously in psychiatry by Sigmund Freud:
The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.
It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind
at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact
as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man's mind is,
therefore, a misstatement of facts.''
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the article will trace and critically evaluate the Illinois judiciary's historical refutation of the Edginton
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 10 Il1. App. 3d 1000, 295 N.E.2d 487 (1st
Dist. 1973) (mere expression of opinion will not support an action for fraud; in order to constitute actionable fraud, misrepresentations must pertain to present or preexisting facts); Peterson Indus., Inc. v. Lake View Trust & Savings Bank, 584 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1978) (mere
expression of opinion or a statement which relates to future or contingent events or probabilities,
does not constitute an actionable misrepresentation in Illinois).
6. Anderson v. Pacific Fire and Marine Ins. Co., [1872] 7 L.R.-C.P. 65, 69.
7. [1885] 29 Ch. D. 459.
8. Id. at 460-61.
9. Id. at 461-62.
10. Id. at 462.
II. Id. at 483. Prior to the Edginton case, the rule appears to have been otherwise. See
W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD AND MISTAKE 88 (1872) ("As distinguished from
the false representation of a fact, the false representation as to a matter of intention, not amounting to a matter of fact, though it may have influenced a transaction, is not a fraud at law,
nor does it afford a ground for relief in equity.").
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doctrine. Illinois remains in the minority of jurisdictions by refusing to
recognize that misrepresentation of an intent to perform a promise or other
future act states a cause of action or defense based on promissory fraud.' 2
Second, the article will explore various Illinois decisions which, in the interests of justice and fairness, recognize an exception that allows actions
or defenses based on promissory fraud. As will be illustrated, the discretionary application of this exception to claims which would typically be
dismissed as nonactionable has produced an outdated and ineffective pattern
of judicial resolution. The article concludes that the time has arrived for
the Illinois judiciary to discard its fossil law by recognizing actions based
on promissory fraud.
THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT

Lord Bowen's recognition that a person's state of mind is as much a fact
as the physical facts of the external world' 3 established a dominant position
in American common law that continues to this day. In the 1930s, treatise
writers conceded that an unperformed promise did not necessarily indicate
that fraud existed;' 4 there still was a general prohibition against recovery
for purely predictive statements." According to one commentator, Thomas
Cooley, the principle of nonrecovery for purely futuristic statements did not
apply when a promise was the device used to accomplish the fraud. Cooley
maintained, "Many courts have held that a statement of a present intention
to perform an act, made as an inducement for a contract, is a statement
of fact, and that if there was no such intention at the time the statement
was made, there was actionable fraud."' 6 Not all unfulfilled promises,
however, form the basis of a fraud action at common law. Some promises,
12. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. An action for promissory fraud simply
allows a plaintiff to state a claim. In order for a plaintiff to recover, he must prove the elements
of fraud as well as the defendant's deceitful state of mind.
13. 29 Ch. D. at 483.
14. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
15. 2 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS THAT ARISE IN§ 354, at 577 (1932).

DEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACTS

16. Id. at 579. Cooley also noted that "[s]ome courts hold that a promise to do something
in the future made as a consideration for a present conveyance, does not constitute fraud even
though at the time it was made the promisor had no intention to keep it, unless such promise
was coupled with a false representation of an existing fact. Nevertheless, a promise is sometimes
the very device resorted to for the purpose of accomplishing the fraud, and the most apt and
effectual means to that end. Such is the case . . .of the purchase of goods with an intention
not to pay for them." Id. at 578-79. For Cooley, the promise made with no existing intention
of performance is the device for which a fraud action will lie. Contrast this with the mystifying
scheme or device exception of Illinois law which theoretically requires something more than
a promise made with no existing intent of performance. See infra notes 96-168 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Zaborowski v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 43 I1. App. 3d 21, 356 N.E.2d
653 ( 2d Dist. 1976) ("It is not enough . ..that the party make a false promise not intending
to keep it; the total facts must show a scheme or device to defraud."); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
79 I1. App. 2d 194, 223 N.E.2d 461 (4th Dist. 1967) ("a promise of future conduct, even
assuming an intention not to perform it, is not the false representation of . . . material fact
essential to relief from fraud").
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for instance, are not fulfilled because the promisor intends to perform but
is subsequently unable or incapable of fulfilling his promise." Acknowledging the widely accepted principle that a fraud action would not lie for the
bare unfulfillment of a promise 8 or for the failure of future events to occur
as predicted,' 9 several commentators have recognized that a promise, prophecy, or prediction represents the minimal facts which would be necessary
to impose liability for promissory fraud.2" For instance, one treatise writer
observed:
A common situation which calls for the application of this principle is
a promise or statement of future conduct by one, who at the time, intends not to fulfill the promise. The promise itself is regarded as a representation of a present intention to perform. Hence, such a promise, made
by one not intending to perform operates as a misrepresentation-a
misrepresentation of the speaker's state of mind, at the time, and is actionable as a misrepresentation of "fact." 2
In reaffirming the vitality of actions for promissory fraud, one commentator in 1953 recognized that the law of fraud was no longer bound up with
the law of contracts:
Most courts have since adopted Bowen's view, though some courts have
been bothered when an action involves a promise not enforceable in a
contract action because of either failure to comply with the statute of frauds
or expiration before the suit was started of the statutory period in which
the contract action must be brought. These worries are ill-founded, for
neither the statute of frauds nor the contract provisions of the statute of
limitations were designed to protect a deceiver from tort liability. 2
As this commentator noted, Edginton and its progeny in American
jurisprudence clearly established the tort of promissory fraud as distinct from
a contract action even though these actions appear to be factually similar.
Thus, acceptance of the Edginton principle carries with it the recognition
17. 2 T. COOLEY, supra note 15, § 354, at 579.

18. F.

BOHLEN

& F.

HARPER, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 220 (4th ed. 1937).

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 452. Another commentator declared:
Certainly, if a defendant promises to do something and fails to carry out his promise the plaintiff must ordinarily look to the law of contract for his remedy. If,
however, the defendant at the time of his statement lacks either the will or the
power to carry out the promise, there is a misrepresentation capable of giving rise
to proceedings for deceit; the diner who orders and consumes his meal without
intending to pay for it is liable in deceit.
H. STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 382 (6th ed. 1946); see also F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 212
(15th ed. 1951) ("a man's intention or purpose at a given time is in itself a matter of fact,
and capable (though the proof be seldom easy) of being found as a fact").
22. C. MORRIS, TORTS § 3, at 271 (1953); see also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 7.10, at 571 (1956) (a promise made by one not intending to perform operates as
a misrepresentation of the promisor's state of mind and is actionable as misrepresentation of
fact); J. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS § 141, at 389 (17th ed. 1977) ("So also an action of
tort will lie for a false representation of intention.").
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that an action in promissory fraud does not necessarily preclude an action
in contract based on the same facts.
Prosser's most recent treatise on the law of torts23 articulates the basic
common law approach of allowing recovery for an action based on promissory fraud. Generally, a prediction solely as to future events is only an
opinion on which another party has no cause to rely.24 Yet, representations
of intention, whether of the speaker or of a third party, are generally regarded
as statements of fact because the assertion of a specific intention necessarily
implies the existence of a present will to execute the intention-even if the
execution is to occur in the future.2 5 Summarizing the current legal landscape, Prosser states that "[aill but a few courts regard a misstatement of
a present intention as a misrepresentation of a material fact; and a promise
made without the intent to perform it is held to be a sufficient basis of
an action of deceit, or for restitution or other equitable relief." 2 6 The Restatement (Second) of Torts also recognizes promissory fraud as a valid concept
of modern common law:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from
action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for
pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation."

Presently, forty states and the District of Columbia have remained faithful
to the common law by allowing recovery for promissory fraud against a
promisor who never had an intention of honoring his promise.28 Illinois,

23. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 720 (4th ed. 1971).
24. Id. at 728.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 729. Illinois and Indiana reject the doctrine that a misrepresentation of a present
intention is a misrepresentation of a material fact or that a promise made without an intent
to perform can be the basis of an action for fraud. See infra note 29. Prosser fails to note,
however, that Illinois does have an exception to the rule against such recovery for fraud where
the promise is a scheme or device to accomplish the fraud. See infra notes 96-168 and accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). One who fraudulently misrepresents to
another that he or a third person intends to do or refrain from doing a particular thing is
subject to liability under the conditions stated in § 525. Id. at § 530. Also, the "recipient
of a fraudulent misrepresentation of intention is justified in relying upon it if the existence
of the intention is material and the recipient has reason to believe that it will be carried out."
Id. at § 544.
28. The following states allow a promissory fraud action against a promisor who fraudulently
misrepresents material facts as to future events: Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d
288 (Ala. 1981); Correa v. Pecos Valley Dev. Corp., 126 Ariz. 601, 617 P.2d 767 (1980); Anthony v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 Ark. 1015, 431 S.W.2d 267 (1968); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1980); Stalos v. Booras, 34 Colo. App.
252, 528 P.2d 254 (1974); Smith v. Frank, 165 Conn. 200, 332 A.2d 76 (1973); Scott-Douglas
Corp. v. Greyhound Corp., 304 A.2d 309 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Howard v, Riggs Nat'l Bank,
432 A.2d 701 (D.C. 1981); Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club, Ltd., 403 So.
2d 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 504 P.2d 386
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together with six sister states, rejects as a matter of law the notion that
a promisor can be sued in fraud for misrepresenting an intention to per-

form a promise in the future.29 It is necessary to trace the rise and current

status of Illinois' minority position on promissory fraud to accurately evaluate

its strength and worth.
NINETEENTH CENTURY ILLINOIS PRECEDENT

The first major Illinois Supreme Court case to address the issue of promissory fraud did not formulate a general ban against it. In Miller v.
Howell,3" the court considered whether an unfulfilled promise by the proprietor of a town to build a storehouse and a bridge by a certain date
amounted to a fraud that would relieve the defendant of his obligation on

(1972); Grefe v. Ross, 231 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1975); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. App. 2d 510,
597 P.2d 683 (1979); Kentucky Rd. Oiling Co. v. Sharp, 257 Ky. 378, 78 S.W.2d 38 (1935);
Forbes v. Wells Beach Casino, Inc., 409 A.2d 646 (Me. 1979); Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc.,
37 Md. App. 470, 378 A.2d 1 (1977); Bernstein v. Levitz, 218 Minn. 576, 16 N.W.2d 744
(1944); Bauer v. Adams, 550 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. App. 1977); Svennungsen v. Svennungsen, 165
Mont. 161, 527 P.2d 640 (1974); Smith v. Wrene, 199 Neb. 753, 261 N.W.2d 620 (1978); Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Nash, 81 Nev. 325, 402 P.2d 650 (1965); Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H.
474, 387 A.2d 1174 (1978); Lipsit v. Leonard, 64 N.J. 276, 315 A.2d 25 (1974); Werner v.
City of Albuquerque, 55 N.M. 189, 229 P.2d 688 (1951); Tribune Printing Co. v. 263 Ninth
Ave. Realty, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 1038, 444 N.E.2d 35, 457 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1982); Ferguson v.
Ferguson, 55 N.C. App. 341, 285 S.E.2d 288 (1982); Lanz v. Naddy, 82 N.W.2d 809 (N.D.
1957); Tibbs v. National Homes Const. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977);
Citation Co. Realtors, Inc. v. Lyon, 610 P.2d 788 (Okla. 1980); Butte Motor Co. v. Strand,
225 Or. 317, 358 P.2d 279 (1960); Brentwater Homes, Inc. v. Weibley, 471 Pa. 17, 369 A.2d
1172 (1977); Robinson v. Standard Stores, Inc., 52 R.I. 271, 160 A. 471 (1932); Woodward
v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 240 S.E.2d 641 (1978); Reitz v. Ampro Royalty Trust, 75 S.D. 167,
61 N.W.2d 201 (1953); Cravens v. Skinner, 626 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Berkeley
Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980); Union Bank v. Jones, 138 Vt.
115, 411 A.2d 1338 (1980); Lloyd v. Smith, 150 Va. 132, 142 S.E. 363 (1928); Markov v.
ABC Transfer & Storage Co., 76 Wash. 2d 388, 457 P.2d 535 (1969); State v. Moore, 273
S.E 2d 821 (W. Va. 1980); Mahonna v. Chaimson, 214 Wis. 396, 253 N.W. 391 (1934); Johnson
v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1975).
29. The following states, in addition to Illinois, do not allow a promisee to bring an action
in promissory fraud against a promisor who has fraudulently misrepresented an intention to
perform a promise in the future: Cosby v. A.M. Smyte Mfg. Co., 158 Ga. App. 587, 281
S.E.2d 332 (1981) (fraud cannot be predicated on promissory statements for future acts); Aloha
Petroglyph, Inc. v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 619 P.2d 518 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (statements
of future conduct cannot be fraud); Tutwiler v. Snodgrass, 428 N.E.2d 1291 (nd. Ct. App.
1981) (fraud cannot be based on matter of subjective future intent or probability); Higgins
v. Lawrence, 107 Mich. App. 178, 309 N.W.2d 194 (1981) (future promises are contractual
and do not constitute fraud); House v. Holloway, 258 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1972) (an action for
fraud is not allowed for promissory future acts); Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d
496 (Tenn. 1978) (promises of future conduct are not actionable as fraud). But cf. Note, Promissory Fraud in Tennessee: A Wrong Without a Remedy, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 308, 341
(1980) (Tennessee courts should recognize that promissory statements accompanied by the intent not to perform are statements of present, exising fact and should be viewed as fraud in
order to prevent gross injustice). The Alaskan judiciary has not yet decided the issue.
30. 2 Ill. 499 (1838).
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a promissory note.' After rejecting a contract defense based on failure of
consideration, 2 the Howell court also rejected the defense of promissory
fraud by stating, "Nor did the evidence offered, amount to a fraud, because
the defendant did not also offer to prove, that when the proprietors made
the declarations of their intention to build in the town, they did it
deceitfully." 33 Thus, rather than reject an action based on promissory fraud,
this case of first impression faithfully reflects the standard common law principle of promissory fraud;3 ' the defendant's failure to prove an intent to
deceive when the proprietor made his promise to build was the only reason
his action for fraud was rejected.3
Twelve years before the landmark English decision of Edginton v.
Fitzmaurice,16 the Illinois Supreme Court held in Gage v. Lewis37 that a
defense of promissory fraud, used to counter a plaintiff's suit in contract,
was an improper defense as a matter of law. 8 In Gage, a surety defended
an action on his bond by claiming that the plaintiff had falsely represented
that if the defendant became a surety for the plaintiff's partner, the plaintiff would retire from the partnership and not compete with the new firm."
The surety claimed that he was not bound on the bond because the plaintiff
violated his promise by setting up a rival business."0 Ignoring the decision
in Howell,"' the Gage court affirmed the judgment against the surety and
referred to the promissory fraud defense:
It cannot be said that these representations and promises were false when
made, for, until the proper time arrived, and plaintiff refused to comply
with them, it could not positively be known that they would not be performed. Even if, at the time they were made, it was not intended to comply with them, it was but an unexecuted intention, which has never been
held, of itself, to constitute
fraud. If they legally amount to anything,
4
they constitute a contract.

1

The Gage court's justification for denying the promissory fraud defense is
a peculiar one. The court stressed the possibility that at the time of the

31. Id. at 500 (the action of assumpsit commenced on a promissory note assigned to the
plaintiff after it became due).
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
35. 2 Ill. at 500. If the Illinois Supreme Court had refused to even consider promissory
fraud as a cause of action, it would have been unnecessary to prove the proprietor's deceitful
state of mind. Id.
36. [1885] 29 Ch. D. 459; see supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
37. 68 Ill. 604 (1873).
38. Id.at 615.
39. Id. at 611.
40. Id.

41. The court never cited its decision in Miller v. Howell, 2 Ill. 498 (1838), which is the
first Illinois Supreme Court case to involve a claim of promissory fraud. Howell is discussed
supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
42. 68 Ill. at 615.
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fraudulent promise, the deceiving promisor might forsake the error of his
ways and instead fulfill his promise.13 Yet, speculation that a defrauder might
later decide to honor his fraudulent promise overlooks the obvious reality
that a plaintiff would not be in a court of law raising the issue of promissory fraud unless the defrauder actually had failed to recant. The defendant in Gage pleaded that the plaintiff made a false promise that never was
fulfilled." To conclude, as the Illinois Supreme Court did, that an action
should not lie because the plaintiff could have fulfilled his fraudulent promise, was unjustified because, in fact, the plaintiff did not act in accordance with his representations. The court failed to recognize that reasonable
people do not bargain with a promisor who has no intention of honoring
a promise on the gossamer speculation that the promisor might change his
mind. Common sense suggests that promisees choose to bargain with promisors who intend to perform their promises. Thus, the decision in Gage
emphasizes that historically Illinois courts have not had a sound foundation
or a well-reasoned legal principle on which to deny promissory fraud actions.
In People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy," the Illinois Supreme Court considered,
for the first time, a cause of action for damages based on promissory fraud."
The plaintiff alleged that he sold $1,000 worth of goods to the defendant
on credit, after relying on the defendant's false representation that he would
repay the debt. Since the defendant was insolvent at the time of his purchase, the plaintiff alleged that, at the time of the purchase, the defendant
had no intention of ever repaying the plaintiff."7 The court, however, noted
that within two months, the defendant had reduced the debt to $375 and
that although he was still insolvent, the defendant had assets that would
cover at least 75% of his outstanding indebtedness."8 Based on these facts,
the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the promissory fraud claim. 4 Citing
Gage, the Healy court concluded that there was no cause of action for promissory fraud where the promisor never intended to perform.5"
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Illinois Supreme Court steadfastly
dismissed promissory fraud claims as a matter of law. In Kitson v. People,5'
a defendant buyer allegedly misrepresented that at the end of the credit
period, he intended to pay for the goods when in fact he was insolvent at
43. Id.
44. Id. at 609.
45. 128 Ill. 9, 20 N.E. 692 (1889).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 14-15, 20 N.E. at 693.
48. Id. at 17, 20 N.E. at 695.
49. Id. ("It is not alleged that the defendant never intended to pay for them, and the pleadings
and exhibits before us negative such an intention.").
50. Id. at 16, 20 N.E. at 694 (citing Gage v. Lewis, 68 111.604 (1873)); see also Murphy
v. Murphy, 189 Ill. 360, 59 N.E. 796 (1901) (promise to perform an act, though accompanied
at the time with an intention not to perform it, is not such a representation as can be the
basis for an action in promissory fraud).
51. 132 111.327, 23 N.E. 1024 (1890).
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the time of the promise and had no intention of paying for them. 2 The
Kitson court observed, "For aught that appears, the defendant may be ready
and willing to pay at the time when it was agreed he should pay." 3 The
court concluded that even if the debt was past due, the plaintiff's recourse
would only be on the contractual promise to pay and not in tort for damages
caused by the fraudulent promise." In refusing to permit an action for
damages, the court stated that before a purchaser could be liable for fraud,
the purchaser "must have been guilty of making false representations of
fact, or practicing some artifice or deception."" The court refused to admit
that a misrepresentation of intent is a misrepresentation of fact:
It has never been held, so far as we are advised, that it will constitute
actionable fraud for a purchaser to buy when he is insolvent, knowing
that to be his condition, and failing to disclose that fact to the vendor,
or that he purchases without any reasonable expectation that he can ever
pay therefore. A contrary rule has been announced in many cases. 6
In stating that a purchaser who buys on credit while insolvent is never liable
for promissory fraud,57 the Kitson court ignored the crucial element of promissory fraud: the defendant's deceitful state of mind. Deceit has traditionally
required that a plaintiff prove scienter, that is, that the defendant knowingly or recklessly uttered a false statement. 8 There is a distinct difference between an insolvent buyer who plans never to pay at the time of purchase,
even if he should later become solvent, and one who intends to pay but
who, at worst, is unduly sanguine or careless in estimating his ability to
repay when the debt falls due. Until quite recently, courts in Illinois refused
to award recovery for merely negligent fraud, whether it was promissory
fraud or any other kind of fraud.59 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Kitson court refused to hold an insolvent buyer liable for intentional damages
in fraud. Nevertheless, it is not inconsistent with the decisions that disallow
recovery for negligent fraud to hold that a buyer who not only knows he
is insolvent, but who also never intends to pay, is liable for his deceit when
the date of payment has passed. 6" By failing to differentiate between cases
in which the due date merely had passed6 and cases in which scienter actually existed,62 the Kitson court unnecessarily prohibited any claim or defense
based on promissory fraud.
52. Id. at 330-31, 23 N.E. at 1025.
53. Id. at 338, 23 N.E. at 1025.
54. Id. at 337, 23 N.E. at 1025. The court acknowledged that a rescission action would
lie where there was a "preconceived design" on the part of the purchaser not to pay. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 337-38, 23 N.E. at 1025.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 3.
59. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 111.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (first case in Illinois which
allowed recovery for negligent fraud).
60. Kitson v. People, 132 Ill. 327, 337, 23 N.E. 1024, 1025 (1890).
61. Id. at 337, 23 N.E. at 1025.
62. Id.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the Illinois judiciary had firmly

adopted the rule that the misrepresentation of an intention to perform an
existing promise could not be treated as a misrepresentation of an existing
fact. 63 Even when considering a replevin action based on fraud, an Illinois

appellate court acknowledged that "[a] promise to perform an act though
accompanied at the time with an intention not to perform it, is not such
a representation as can be made the ground of an action at law. '"' 6 A few
years later, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the rule of nonrecovery to
a chancery action initiated to annul a deed of conveyance based on fraud,"

while yet another court refused to allow promissory fraud as a defense to
a contract action.66 Courts imposed these specific restrictions in addition to
the general rule that a plaintiff could not base any fraud action on a
fraudulent promise, even when the defendant never intended to perform. 61
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN ERROR PERPETUATED

Well into the twentieth century, Illinois courts continued to disallow actions based on promissory fraud. In Miller v. Sutliff,68 the Illinois Supreme
Court provided a new rationale for the general rule that an action for pro-

missory fraud could not lie even when the promisor indisputably had no
intention of fulfilling the promise at the time the promise was made. 69 In
Sutliff, three defendants represented to the plaintiff, Miller, that they were

owners of iron mills near Youngstown, Ohio, and that they would transfer
one of the mills to Miller's land and the remaining mills to the community
in which Miller lived."0 The consideration for this promise was that Miller
and his neighbors would convey to the defendants an undivided one-half

interest in any coal or other minerals located under the transferred land."'
The defendants further promised that they would employ many men in the
community and would build a railroad for the transportation needs of the
community." Lured by promises that the defendants would build the railroad
63. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
64. Murray v. R.P. Smith & Sons, 42 I11.
App. 548, 554 (1891).
65. Haenni v. Bleisch, 146 111.
262, 267, 34 N.E. 153, 154 (1893) ("If, therefore, a court
of equity can be resorted to, on the facts here alleged, to annul a deed of conveyance to real
estate, then, in every case in which there is a breach of the vendee's contract to pay for the
land conveyed, the vendor can avoid the deed.").
194 (1898); see also Gage v. Lewis,
66. Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Bates, 176 111.
68 I11.
604 (1873), which is discussed supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
67. Phelan v. Kuhn, 51 Ill. App. 644, 647 (1893) (although when appellee made the agreement, he may have fraudulently intended to break it, the only remedy for his actual breach
is upon the agreement); see also Potter v. Potter, 65 Ill. App. 74 (1896); Day v. Fort Scott
Inv. and Improvement Co., 53 Ill. App. 165 (1894), aff'd, 153 Ill. 293, 38 N.E. 567 (1894);
Peake v. Walton, 52 Ill. App. 90 (1893).
68. 241 Il1. 521, 89 N.E. 651 (1909).
69. Id. at 525, 89 N.E. at 652.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 524, 89 N.E. at 651.
72. Id. at 525, 89 N.E. at 652.

19831

PR OMISSOR Y FRAUD

before the onset of winter and would provide a steamboat on the Ohio River
to transport the mill machinery, Miller conveyed to the defendants the requested interest in his mineral rights.73 Miller petitioned the court to set aside
the deed on the ground that the defendants refused to honor their promises. 1
Affirming the trial court's dismissal of Miller's action, the Illinois Supreme
Court reasoned:
If an intention not to perform constituted fraud, every transaction might
be avoided where the facts justified an inference that a party did not intend to pay the consideration or keep his agreement. A mere breach of
contract does not amount to a fraud, and neither knowledge of inability
to perform, nor an intention to do so, would make the transaction
fraudulent. 7
The problem with this cryptic justification of the rule is that it erroneously
and unjustifiably insinuates that contract law would be destroyed or seriously
impaired if a fraud action were allowed as an alternative theory to a breach
of contract theory.76 As long as the fraud is not promissory fraud, an Illinois plaintiff may sue contemporaneously for breach of contract and fraud.77
No Illinois court has suggested that the fraud theory might somehow diminish
the stability of contracts. It was unsound, therefore, for the Sutliff court
to hold that promissory fraud actions would undermine the viability of contract actions.
The Sutliff court suggested that every breach of contract might lead to
an alternate action in damages for promissory fraud." This suggestion is
legally erroneous because the court failed to recognize that promissory fraud
involves an element which is entirely independent of the elements necessary
to establish breach of contract-namely, the promisor's deceptive intent. The
necessity of proving deceptive intent therefore ensures that most actions based
on breach of contract will not serve as the basis for additional damage
73. Id.
74. Id. at 523-24, 89 N.E. at 651 (trial court granted defendants' demurrer to the complaint
even though the demurrer necessarily admitted the truth of the allegations due to a want of
equity).
75. Id. at 526-27, 89 N.E. at 652.
76. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, §§ 96, 129; see also, e.g., Hotze v. Schlanser, 410 Ill.
265, 102 N.E.2d 131 (1951) (in a contract action, plaintiff's claim that his signature was obtained by fraud was an affirmative defense required to be proved like any other fact); Mother
Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill. App. 3d 37, 390 N.E.2d 393 (1st Dist. 1979)
(terms of a written contract executed in conjunction with fraud are irrelevant to a cause of
action grounded in tort); Bliss v. Rhodes, 66 I11.App. 3d 895, 384 N.E.2d 512 (2d Dist. 1978)
(in the absence of fraud, inadequacy of consideration, exorbitance of price or improvidence
in contract will not constitute a defense for failure to perform); Shanahan v. Schindler, 63
11. App. 3d 82, 379 N.E.2d 1307 (lst Dist. 1978) (party who fraudulently induces another
to enter into a contract cannot eliminate the defense of fraud by executing a substitute contract
without disclosing the original fraud). For cases in which the court allowed the alternative action,
see generally Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (4th Dist. 1982); Baker,
Bourgeois & Assoc. v. Taylor, 84 111.App. 3d 909, 410 N.E.2d 55 (1st Dist. 1980).
77. See, e.g., infra note 86.
78. Miller v. Sutliff, 241 I11. 521, 528, 89 N.E. 651, 653 (1909).
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recovery for fraud. The court also failed to consider that contracts may be

unperformed for various reasons that are very different from an intentional
fraudulent misrepresentation of future facts and events. For example, impossibility or inability to perform a contract are problems that may beset
a promisor who acts with the utmost good faith.79 Furthermore, a promisor
who intended to perform at the time of entering into the promise, but who
later reneges, clearly is in a different category from a promisor who never

intended to carry out a promise from its very inception. In the former instance, scienter and the other elements of deceit have not occurred

simultaneously; in the latter instance, the elements all conjoin contemporaneously to establish the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation."0
The chimerical supposition that an action for promissory fraud would
debilitate contract law has not been articulated in any one of the overwhelming majority of states that recognize actions for promissory fraud." A plaintiff bringing a promissory fraud action has the difficult burden of proving
that the promisor had a fraudulent state of mind at the time of entering
into the transaction and never intended to fulfill the promise. Only objec-

tive evidence, such as admissions against interest or contradictory promises,
would be useful to prove a culpable state of mind, because the adversary

is unlikely to confess as to her deceitful frame of mind at the time of her
promise. Making it even more difficult for a plaintiff to prove an intent
to deceive, Illinois law requires that fraud must be pleaded specifically and
particularly, without merely conclusory allegations contained in the
complaint.82 Illinois law also requires that a plaintiff seeking recovery for
fraud must prove the elements of fraud, which include establishing the promisor's culpable state of mind with clear and convincing evidence-a higher
standard than the usual preponderance standard of civil cases.8 3 Moreover,
since one may freely plead alternate and inconsistent counts in Illinois,"4
it is an antiquated requirement that one must choose between a contract
79. See, e.g., Joseph v. Lake Michigan Mortgage Co., 106 111.App. 3d 988, 436 N.E.2d
663 (Ist Dist. 1982) (party may not avoid a contract entered into in good faith if subsequently,
that party is unable to perform because of a mistaken opinion of its legal effect).
80. See supra note 2.
81. For a listing of states which allow actions for promissory fraud, see supra note 28.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 43(4) (1979). See also Goldberg v. Goldberg, 103 Ill. App.
3d 584, 588, 431 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (lst Dist. 1982) (to allege a cause of action for fraud,
pleadings must contain specific allegations thereof); Wiersma v. Workman Plumbing, Heating
& Cooling, Inc., 87 Il1. App. 3d 535, 538, 409 N.E.2d 159, 162 (3rd Dist. 1980) ("To properly
allege a cause of action for fraud, the pleadings must contain specific allegations of facts from
which fraud is the necessary or probable inference."); Younger v. Revelle, 78 II1. App. 3d
1, 4, 397 N.E.2d 221, 223 (5th Dist. 1979) (fraud must be pleaded with such specificity, particularity and certainty as to apprise the opposing party of the allegations); Browning v. Heritage
Ins. Co., 33 111. App. 3d 943, 948, 338 N.E.2d 912, 917 (2d Dist. 1975) (fraud must be shown
by specific allegations of facts from which fraud is the necessary or probable inference).
83. See supra note 2; see also Younger v. Revelle, 78 Il1. App. 3d 1, 5, 397 N.E.2d 221,
224 (5th Dist.1979) ("Presupposing that the complaint stated a cause of action, the evidence
at trial failed to establish the existence of fraud by clear and convincing proof.").
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 43(2) (1979).
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action and an alternate promissory fraud action.85 A plaintiff should be free
to plead a breach of contract action and a promissory fraud action in the
alternative because the elements of the two wrongs are not identical. 6

The Sutliff court, however, conceded that there were Illinois cases in which
conveyances had been set aside in equity when a party transferred home and
hearth to another person, often a family member, under the promise that

the transferees would take care of the transferor for the remainder of the
transferor's life.87 The court distinguished those cases, stating that the prohibition against promissory fraud in cases involving ordinary business transactions for gain did not apply." It is mystifying, however, why deceit is
more tolerable in the business world than in cases of fraud among family
members. Nevertheless, the Sutliff court acknowledged that James Miller
might obtain relief in equity but could not obtain relief at law because a
law court could not adequately measure the damages incurred by the defendants' refusal to move the iron mills, to build a railroad, or to employ many

men in the community.89 The paradox of this acknowledgement is that James
Miller never asked for damages but simply asked the court to set aside his
deed and remove the cloud on his title.90
This inconsistent approach to promissory fraud is the weakest of reeds
85. See Miller v. Sutliff, 241 I11.521, 526-27, 89 N.E. 651, 652 (1909) (court determined
that contract law would be seriously impaired or destroyed if fraud action were allowed as
an alternative theory to a breach of contract). But see Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School,
69 Ill. 2d 320, 334, 371 N.E.2d 634, 641 (1977).
86. In fact, Illinois courts allow alternate causes of action in a complaint based respectively
on a contract theory and a tort theory based on fraud. The Illinois Supreme Court in Steinberg
v. Chicago Medical School, 69 111.2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977), specifically held that an
action of fraud as well as an action for a breach of contract was an appropriate theory of
recovery. In Steinberg, a medical school applicant alleged that the defendant medical school
breached its agreement to evaluate his application according to the academic criteria stated
in the school catalogue. The plaintiff argued that the medical school rejected his application
because of unstated criteria that involved the financial ability of the applicant to donate large
sums of money to the school. Id. The trial court dismissed both the contract theory and the
fraud theory. Id. at 332, 371 N.E.2d at 640. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of
the contract theory but affirmed the dismissal of the promissory fraud theory. Id. In reversing
the lower courts, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Here an action for fraud is consistent with the recognition of a contract action.
The law creates obligations "on the ground that they are dictated by reason and
justice." . . . So here the facts of this situation mandate that equity imply an
obligation by the defendant. We note this since the circumstances before us justify
a contract action, as well as a fraud action, or, in the event no contract can by
proven, an action on an implied-in-law obligation of the defendant.
Id. at 334, 371 N.E.2d at 641.
Because Steinberg emphasizes that Illinois law allows the conjunction of a contract cause
of action and a fraud cause of action in the same lawsuit, the Illinois Supreme Court in Steinberg
implicitly determined that a promissory fraud theory is compatible with a breach of contract
action. Id.
87. Miller v. Sutliff, 241 Il1. 521, 528, 89 N.E. 651, 653 (1909).
88. Id. at 528, 89 N.E. at 652.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 528, 89 N.E. at 653.
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on which to continue the ban. The Sutliff court suggested that James Miller

might obtain relief for promissory fraud in equity.9 Now that equity and
law have merged in Illinois as a result of the Judicial Reform Act,92 the
Sutliff case is obsolete as precedent for the ban on promissory fraud because
the court denied recovery based on the then existent schism between equity
and law. 93 With the merger of law and equity, the rule that allows for

recovery in equity must logically allow for recovery in law as well; there
are no longer two sets of legal principles for two distinct courts.9" Nevertheless, the ban on promissory fraud has continued after the Sutliff case
95
without deviation.
THE SCHEME OR DEVICE EXCEPTION

In 1922, the Illinois Supreme Court tentatively created an exception to
the general rule prohibiting recovery for promissory fraud. In Luttrell v.
Wyatt," the defendant cajoled the plaintiff into lending money to the defendant's brother. The defendant represented that he would personally guarantee
the loan and that his brother owned real estate which could be used as
security.97 After being threatened with a grand jury indictment, the defendant agreed to reimburse the plaintiff for the defaulted loan." Before repaying
the loan, however, the defendant warned that the plaintiff's wife and son
were after the money, and the defendant expressed his concern that the plaintiff alone should receive the payment.9 9 Believing the defendant, the plaintiff isolated himself from his wife, his son, and his lawyer.' 0 The defendant
then promised that as soon as the plaintiff's son dropped the contract action against him, he would repay the money.'0 ' The plaintiff alleged that
91. Id.
92. "With the adoption in 1964 of the new Judicial Article to the Illinois Constitution in
1870, the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity was formally eliminated and
this was carried over into the Judicial Article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 2-601, at 4 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (historical and practice notes). For a case which
has eliminated the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity, see Balcor Income
Properties, Ltd. v. Arlen Realty, Inc., 95 111. App. 3d 700, 420 N.E.2d 612 (1st Dist. 1981)
(the merger of law and equity has eliminated the distinction on which this rule was based,
and thus there is no compelling reason to follow this obsolescent adage).
93. 241 Ill. at 528, 89 N.E. at 653.
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. For courts that continued to deny actions premised on promissory fraud, see, e.g., Keithley
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 271 Ill. 584, 111 N.E. 503 (1916); Grubb v. Milan, 249 Ill. 456,
94 N.E. 927 (1911); Ingersoll v. Brown & Co., 205 Il. App. 537 (1st Dist. 1917); Meixner
v. Western Live Stock Ins. Co., 203 Il. App. 523 (2d Dist. 1916); Ensign v. Lehmann, 192
Ill. App. 578 (1st Dist. 1915); Buyer's Index Pub. Co. v. American Shoe Polish Co., 169 Ill.
App. 618 (1st Dist. 1912); Koehler v. Glaum, 169 Il1. App. 537 (1st Dist. 1912).
96. 305 Ill.
274 (1922).
97. Id. at 276.
98. Id. at 276-77.
99. Id. at 277.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 278 (plaintiff's son and trustee of the mortgage sued the defendant to recover
the mortgage balance).
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the defendant falsely promised payment only to beguile the plaintiff into
releasing the defendant from the debt.' 2 The Illinois Supreme Court set aside
an injunction that the defendant had obtained to prevent the plaintiff from

suing the defendant.' 03 Noting that the ban on promissory fraud actions did
not apply because the promise was accompanied by a "number of false

representations" made by the defendant,"0 the Illinois Supreme Court determined that an action could be based on the defendant's fraudulent promise
to pay the plaintiff. The court held that a "representation of a future intention absolute in form, deliberately made for the purpose of influencing the
conduct of the other party and then acted upon by him, is generally the
source of a right, and may amount to a contract enforceable as such by
a court of equity."'' 0 To ensure the plaintiff's recovery for the defendant's
deceit, the court reasoned that even if no promissory fraud action lay, the
plaintiff still had an action for breach of contract.' 6
Until 1948, the hope of a well-entrenched exception to the general ban
on promissory fraud collapsed beneath the weight of cases disallowing
recovery.0 7 Then, in Roda v. Berko,' ° the Illinois Supreme Court firmly
developed the exception beyond the tentative gropings in Luttrell. In Roda,
the plaintiff sued in equity to cancel a warranty deed issued in reliance on
defendant's fraudulent promise that the deeded land would be used for a
factory of prefabricated houses.' 9 Instead of developing the land as promised, and thereby enhancing the value of the surrounding property, the
102. Id. at 279.
103. Id. (injunction, which was obtained to enjoin the prosecution in assumpsit, allowed
the notes to be cancelled and relieved the defendant from liability).
104. Id. at 282.
105. Id.at 283 (citing 2 POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1811)).
106. Id.
107. See Brodsky v. Frank, 342 111.110, 173 N.E. 775 (1930) (plaintiff denied recovery for
478, 165 N.E. 231 (1929) (proan action based on promissory fraud); Bielby v. Bielby, 333 I11.
missory fraud was insufficient to vitiate a marriage); May v. Chas. 0. Larson Co., 304 I11.
App. 137, 26 N.E.2d 139 (1st Dist. 1940) (defendant could not use failure to achieve an increase in profits as a defense to the enforcement of the notes; the defense of misrepresentation
must be based on past or present facts and not on the promise to do an act in the future);
Thomson v. Miner, 303 II1. App. 335, 25 N.E.2d 137 (3rd Dist. 1940) (recovery for fraud
denied when it was based on a failure to comply with a future promise); Wright v. Peabody
Coal Co., 290 Ill.
App. 110, 8 N.E.2d 68 (3d Dist. 1937) (court dismissed the fraud action
because it was based on a failure to comply with a future promise and a fraud action generally
requires a willful misrepresentation of past or present facts); Johnson v. Johnson, 257 Ill. App.
587 (1st Dist. 1930) (promissory fraud was not sufficient to annul marriage where wife married
for the sole purpose of obtaining the name of a married woman, with no intent to live with
her husband or consummate the marriage); Chilvers v. Huenemoerder, 250 111.App. 499 (2d
Dist. 1928) (plaintiff denied contract rescission based on fraud because he failed to set forth
facts on which to base the action); Steven v. Combination Found. Co., 231 Il1. App. 360 (3d
Dist. 1923) (recovery for promissory fraud denied because plaintiff failed to State all the elements
1924)
of fraud). But see Seimer v. James Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co., 299 F. 651 (E.D. Ill.
(court applied Texas law which allowed recovery for real estate fraud consisting of a false
promise to do a future act).
108. 401 Il1. 335, 81 N.E.2d 912 (1948).
109. Id. at 338, 81 N.E.2d at 914.
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defendant turned the deeded land into a junkyard which the plaintiff alleged
was a nuisance to his remaining land." ' The defendant vigorously argued
the general rule that a promise to perform an act, although accompanied
by an intention not to perform the act, is not such a false representation
of facts as to constitute actionable fraud."' In reversing the dismissal of
the plaintiff's action, the Illinois Supreme Court asserted, "It is true . . .
that this is the general rule, but this general rule is subject to qualification
and does not apply to the case we are here considering."" ' 2 The court cautioned that although "language used in some of the cases, standing alone,
would seem to support defendant," ' 3 the general rule was limited by the
"facts and circumstances of the particular case.'"" The court first made
the dubious distinction that in none of the key cases espousing the general
rule had there been a showing of "deliberate fraud by which a party had
been induced to act to his damage."" ' The court then made another distinction, finding that in none of the key cases supporting the general rule was
the existence of fraud "shown by anything other than the broken promise."" 6
Whatever the validity of the reasoning, the Roda court declared:
It is also the rule that a promise to perform an act, though accompanied
at the time with an intention not to perform it, is not such a false representation as will constitute fraud sufficient to predicate thereon a cause of
action. However, in cases where the false promise or representation of
intention or of future conduct is the scheme or device to accomplish the
fraud and thereby cheat and defraud another of his property, equity will
right the wrong by restoring the parties to the positions they occupied
before the fraud was committed.''
Although the Roda court's pronouncement of the scheme or device exception appears to be based on a sound legal principle, the reasoning of the
decision is self-destructing because the only scheme or device in the case
was the one fraudulent promise." ' Unlike the Luttrell case, the Roda decision did not involve persistent fraud that had been perpetrated on the plaintiff in various ways other than promissory fraud. The general rule that one
110. Id. at 339, 81 N.E.2d at 914.
11. Id. at 341-43, 81 N.E.2d at 915-16.
112. Id. at 341, 81 N.E.2d at 915.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.If there are fraudulent misrepresentations of past or present material facts other
than the promissory ones, as was true in Luttrell, it is not necessary to rely on the promissory
fraud. It is meaningless to allow recovery for promissory fraud in a case where one would
recover because of non-promissory fraud involving misrepresentation of past or present physical
facts other than a defendant's state of mind.
117. Id. at 340, 81 N.E.2d at 915 (emphasis added) (citing Luttrell v. Wyatt, 305 I11.274,
137 N.E. 95 (1922); Abbott v. Loving, 303 Ill. 154, 135 N.E. 442 (1922)).
118. Id.at 338, 81 N.E.2d at 914 (defendant represented that real estate purchased from

plaintiff would be used to build a factory for the making of prefabricated homes when in
fact it was used as a junk yard).
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cannot recover for a mere promissory fraud is an illusion if a single promissory misrepresentation is enough to constitute a scheme or device." 9 The
court in Roda simply has replaced, sub silentio, a general rule of liability
for promissory fraud for a general rule of nonliability. The Roda court makes
no attempt to reconcile the general rule with the scheme or device exception. Such a reconciliation, however, is impossible, because the exception
is a purely discretionary development.
At first glance, the impact of Roda appears to have far-reaching effects
for Illinois plaintiffs desiring to bring promissory fraud actions. The Roda
decision, however, has had no such far-reaching effects primarily because
the court applied the exception without any underlying rationale. To preserve
the integrity and viability of the general rule against liability for promissory
fraud, the Roda court should have confined its holding to equity actions.
Such a limitation would have been consistent with several Illinois cases prior
to Roda which held that the general rule of nonliability for promissory fraud,
though applicable to actions at law based on fraud, did not apply to equity
actions.' 20 If this was the Illinois Supreme Court's intent, then after Roda,
the general rule of nonliablity for promissory fraud still reigned supreme
in actions at law, while in chancery actions, judges and lawyers would have
to contend with the general rule and its puzzling scheme or device exception.' 2
Any attempt to confine the exception to equity cases after 1964, however,
was nullified by the merger of equity and law.' 22
Nevertheless, by the 1950s and 1960s, the scheme or device exception was
used with regularity by the Illinois courts. As illustrated by the case of Willis
v. Atkins,'2 Illinois courts were particularly prone to rely on the exception
in cases in which the defendant used various machinations to fraudulently
mislead a hapless plaintiff over a period of time. In Willis, the defendant
promised to divorce his wife and marry the plaintiff if she would provide
him with money for his funeral business.'2 4 The plaintiff gave the defendant
land and cash in reliance on his promise of marriage.' 25 The court carefully
noted that the defendant frequently visited the plaintiff's home, ate meals
with her, handled her affairs, acted intimately with her, and portrayed images of a "rosy future" for both of them while he was secretly scheming
119. Id. at 340, 31 N.E.2d at 915.
120. Davids v. Davids, 333 111.327, 164 N.E. 662 (1929) (constructive trust was established
in favor of the children when son persuaded his mother to deed the land to him instead of
preparing a will so that he could distribute the shares to the children as she requested); De
Costa v. Bischer, 287 111,598 (1919) (court rescinded contract and cancelled deed when grantor
voluntarily conveyed all his property in consideration of support and maintenance, but grantee
refused to perform); Frazier v. Miller, 16 111.48 (1854) (court allowed rescission of contract
when a complete remedy could not be attained at law).
121. See infra notes 123-68 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 92.
123. 412 I11.
245, 106 N.E.2d 370 (1952).
124. Id. at 249, 106 N.E.2d at 371.
125. Id. at 249-51, 106 N.E.2d at 372-73.
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to obtain what he could of the plaintiff's property without marrying her.'"
Obviously disturbed by the defendant's alleged knavery, the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that the gulled woman should reap the return of her land
and cash.'" Reminded of the ban on promissory fraud actions, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejoined:
We are aware of these decisions and of the general rule but believe it
has no application to a situation such as that presented here, where the
fraud was perpetrated and the confidence gained not by mere promises
but by a course of conduct covering a period of almost twelve years in
which [defendant] by pretending great interest in the [plaintiff's] welfare
secured not only her property but a large
and devotion to her affairs,
28
measure of his support.'
As evinced by this passage, the Illinois Supreme Court in Willis interpreted
the scheme or device exception very narrowly by limiting it to a fraud that

had been perpetrated for many years by a defendant seeking to obtain a
substantial interest in the plaintiff's money. The Willis court's interpreta-

tion and application of the exception is much more restrictive than the Roda
court's, although it is arguably the same scheme or device exception. The
inconsistent application of this discretionary exception in Roda and Willis
indicates that the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet determined which plaintiffs may state a promissory fraud cause of action based on a scheme or
device.
126. Id. at 260, 106 N.E.2d at 377.
127. Id. at 258, 106 N.E.2d at 378.
128. Id. at 259, 106 N.E.2d at 377. Other contemporary decisions, however, continued to
prohibit recovery for any promissory fraud. See, e.g., Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d
71 (8th Cir. 1959) (when employer induced employee with a pension plan despite his intent
to terminate the employee before he was eligible for the pension, it constituted a future promise to do an act; therefore, it was insufficient for recovery under Illinois law); North Am.
Plywood Corp. v. Osh Kosh Trunk and Luggage Co., 263 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1959) (court
dismissed action which alleged that the defendant had no intention of paying for his purchases
because it was a promise to do a future act which does not constitute fraud); Stewart-Warner
Corp. v. Remco, Inc., 205 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1953) (although contract was broad enough to
excuse nondelivery of television sets to the exclusive distributor, Illinois law bars fraud actions
based on future promises to do an act); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wainer, 4 111.App.
2d 233, 124 N.E.2d 29 (lst Dist. 1955) (demand note to a bank, accompanied by a secret
agreement that the note would not be paid by its maker, was a representation of a future
intent insufficient to support a defense of fraud). For a recognition that Illinois has consistently remained in the minority, see Gass v. National Container Corp., 171 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.
I11. 1959), appeal dismissed, 271 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1959), where the court states as follows:
The minority rule is tfaat fraud cannot be predicated upon a mere promise, even
though it is accompanied by a present intention not to perform it. The reasoning
of the courts following the minority rule is that even under such circumstances
the promise is not a misrepresentation of an existing fact, and there is a mere unexecuted intention which does not constitute fraud, and that a mere breach of contract does not amount to a fraud, and that neither knowledge of inability to perform, nor an intention to do so would make the transaction fraudulent.
Reminiscent of Willis v. Atkins, 412 I11.245, 106 N.E.2d 370 (1952), an Illinois appellate court
in Kriegel v. Miedema, 20 III. App. 2d 235, 155 N.E.2d 815 (Ist Dist. 1959), admonished:
"Something more than failure to keep the promise must be shown to prove a fraudulent in-

1983]

PROMISSOR Y FRA UD

The appellate court in Sullivan v. Sullivan shed some additional light on
the scheme or device exception.' 29 In Sullivan, the defendant, a twenty-oneyear-old woman, admitted that soon after her sixty-four-year-old husband
transferred real estate to her in joint tenancy, she moved out of the marital
domicile to another town."'3 The plaintiff husband claimed that he gave her
the property interest only because she had promised to live with him.' 3 ' Consequently, the husband sued for a divorce because of his wife's subsequent
adultery and asked for a rescission of the real estate deed because of her
false representations and lack of consideration.' 3 2 The appellate court affirmed the decree of divorce and the voiding of the conveyance on the ground
that the wife's promise, made without an intention of honoring it, was part
of a scheme or device to procure the real estate interest. 33 The court held
that "equity will provide relief in those cases where the promise made without
intent to perform, or the false representation, is, in fact, part of the scheme
or device to procure the conveyance."' 34 The court considered what the
scheme or device was in this case apart from the fraudulent promise itself,
and concluded that the wife's conduct prior to the time of the conveyance
could be considered as evidence of her bad faith and involvement in a scheme
or device to swindle her husband.' 35
tent." Id. at 240, 155 N.E.2d at 818. The appellate court was well aware that it would not
be easy to prove the fraudulent intent behind the promise:
It is true that the subject of a man's mind is a fact which may be proved as any
other fact when certain issues such as belief or reliance upon representations are
involved. But a strong and persuasive case must be made before a court will commence an inquiry of this character so long after the actual transactions, with the
death of the principals and other circumstances intervening.
Id. at 241, 155 N.E.2d at 818. Despite the Kriegel case, Illinois courts during this period still
remained confused as to whether a misrepresented state of mind was a fact. See, e.g., Plavec
v. Plavec, 30 Il1. App. 2d 345, 349, 174 N.E.2d 578, 580 (1st Dist. 1961) ("Authorities cited
by plaintiff indicate that some promises, not misrepresentations of existing facts, wrongfully
entered into with the intention to deceive and for the purpose of obtaining an advantage, may
be the basis of equitable relief from a judgement or decree obtained by fraud.").
129. 79 Ill. App. 2d 194, 223 N.E.2d 461 (4th Dist. 1967).
130. Id.at 195, 223 N.E.2d at 462.
131. Id.at 197, 223 N.E.2d at 463.
132. Id.at 195-96, 223 N.E.2d at 462.
133. Id. at 199, 223 N.E.2d at 464.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 200, 223 N.E.2d at 464. In the same year, however, an Illinois appellate court
in an almost identical equitable action for rescission involving the sale of stock, invoked the
general rule against promissory fraud without distinguishing the Sullivan case. Illinois Rockford
Corp. v. Kulp, 88 1I. App. 2d 458, 232 N.E.2d 190 (1st Dist. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
41 IlI. 2d 215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968). By what standard is the act of a 21-year-old woman
in breaking a promise to live with a 64-year-old man more of a scheme or device than swindling another out of stock? The apparent arbitrariness of the general rule and its exception is
illustrated by Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1003 (1970), where the court, allowing a claim for promissory fraud in an action to recover
from a stock swindle, declared that the "general rule in Illinois denies recovery for fraud based
on a false representation of intention or future conduct, but there is a well-recognized exception, where, as here, the false promise or representation of future conduct is claimed to be
the scheme used to accomplish the fraud." Id. at 358.
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The Sullivan court properly concluded that a fraudulent state of mind
marked by bad faith does not arise on the spur of the moment. Since all
deceit can be characterized as bad faith that precedes the actual promise
and continues up to the time of the fraudulent promise, one who entertains
an intent not to perform a promise and adheres to that secret intent is engaged
in a continuous course of bad faith. The Sullivan court explained that if
scheme or device is coterminous with bad faith, then every time one knowingly intends not to perform a promise there is a redundant characterization
of a scheme or device.' 36 The Seventh Circuit succinctly characterized the
meaningless surplusage of the Illinois scheme or device exception by stating
that the "law has been long established that a scheme to defraud may consist of suggestions and promises as to the future, when not made in good
faith but with deceptive intent."' 37 If every deceitful promise equals bad
faith and if bad faith equals a scheme or device, there is no logical way
to avoid the conclusion that every deceitful promise is a scheme or device.
The ineluctable result is that the exception has engulfed the general rule,
although the Illinois courts have yet to acknowledge this reality. The general
rule of nonliability for promissory fraud has been engulfed by the logic of
the scheme or device exception when the deceit implicit in the promise is
sufficient to constitute a scheme or device.
By the 1970s it became clear that the Illinois courts knew how to use
the exception to gut the general rule of nonliability. 38 For instance, in Roth
v. Roth'39 the plaintiff, an ex-wife, petitioned the trial court to compel her
ex-husband to pay her support as directed by the divorce decree.' 0 The defendant counterpetitioned to modify the decree on the ground that the appropriate support level had been determined based on the ex-wife's statement that she had no plans to remarry, despite her actual intent to remarry
as soon as possible.'' In fact, the ex-wife remarried exactly thirty-one days
after the divorce decree.' 2 The Illinois Supreme Court held that "[tihe
[counter]petition was filed within two years after the entering of the decree
and it is clear that it made allegations of fact which, if true, would entitle
[defendant] to the relief sought."' 4 3 The court thereupon granted the defen136. 79 II1. App. 2d at 199, 223 N.E.2d at 464.
137. United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964).
138. In Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 111.2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977), the
court easily avoided the rule prohibiting recovery in damages for promissory fraud by noting:
"We concede the general rule denies recovery for fraud based on a false representation of
intention or future conduct, but there is a recognized exception where the false promise or
representation of future conduct is alleged to be the scheme employed to accomplish the fraud."
Id. at 334, 371 N.E.2d at 641.
139. 45 Ill. 2d 19, 256 N.E.2d 838 (1970).
140. 45 Ill. 2d at 20-21, 256 N.E.2d at 839.
141. Id. at 21, 256 N.E.2d at 839.
142. Id. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike the counterpetition. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court and the Illinois Supreme Court in turn reversed
the appellate court and affirmed the trial court.
143. 45 I11. 2d at 23, 256 N.E.2d at 840; see also Deahl v. Deahl, 13 II1. App. 3d 150,
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dant's request to modify the decree without any obligatory mention of the
scheme or device exception.
Although Illinois courts have been reluctant to fully incorporate the exception into a general rule of liability, they have applied the exception
regularly, although without any consistent or unified judicial rationale. The
judicial uncertainty, however, that has characterized the scheme or device
exception is reflected in Louis v. Louis.' 4 In that case, a woman was granted
an annulment on the ground that her husband had represented his desire
to consummate the marriage and have children when, in actuality, he did

not have such an intention.'" The court held that the "statement of a matter in the future, if affirmed as a fact, may amount to a fraudulent

misrepresentation, but it must amount to an assertion of a fact and not
an agreement to do something in the future."' 4 6 Appellate court decisions,
like the Louis decision, often have either ignored or rejected the scheme
or device exception and have cited the general rule against recovery for promissory fraud as a sufficient reason to dismiss legal claims based on a
fraudulent promise.'" In effect, some courts have incorporated the excep300 N.E.2d 497 (1st Dist. 1973) (in a divorce proceeding, a wife's failure to disclose her immediate intention to remarry constituted fraud because it was a material fact pertinent to the
determination of alimony).
144. 124 I11.
App. 2d 325, 260 N.E.2d 469 (1st Dist. 1970).
145. Id. at 326-27, 260 N.E.2d 470-71.
146. Id. at 329-30, 260 N.E.2d at 472; see also Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 102 Ill. App.
3d 483, 490-91, 429 N.E.2d 1267, 1274 (lst Dist. 1982) (Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practice Act is broader than common law, allowing recovery for any deception or false promise with no showing of intent to deceive, misrepresentation or statement of fact or false promise); Hereen v. Smith, 276 111.
App. 438, 442 (1934) (no fraud in sale of real estate when
statements did not amount to assertions of fact); Owens v. Union Bank, 260 II1. App. 595,
601 (1931) (defendant was guilty of fraudulent representation in sale of real estate because
statements of future matters were assertions of fact).
147. See, e.g., People v. Gordon, 45 111.
App. 3d 282, 359 N.E.2d 794 (1st Dist. 1977) (without
referring to scheme or device exception, court analogized theft to a fraud action since both
are limited to past or present misrepresentations); McAfee V. Rockford Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 521, 352 N.E.2d 50 (2d Dist. 1976) (court dismissed promissory fraud
action stating the general rule that "an action for fraud or deceit will not lie for misrepresentation as to a future event," but the court ignored the scheme or device exception); Alikonis
v. Alikonis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 159, 343 N.E.2d 161 (4th Dist. 1976) (court denied modification
of divorce settlement based on promissory fraud stating the general rule but ignoring the scheme
or device exception); Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 Ill.
App. 3d 961, 328 N.E.2d 350 (1st.
Dist. 1975) (court denied recovery for promissory fraud without considering the scheme or
device exception); Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Space Rentals, 62 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (dismissed action for promissory fraud without considering the scheme or device exception); Tonchen v. All-Steel Eqtiip., Inc., 13 Il.App. 3d 454, 300 N.E.2d 616 (2d Dist. 1973)
(court dismissed action for promissory fraud without considering the scheme or device exception); Hurley v. Frontier Ford Motors, Inc., 12 Ill.
App. 3d 905, 299 N.E.2d 387 (2d Dist.
1973) (court denied recovery for promissory fraud stating that "the exception [to the rule]
that if one who makes the future promise has no present intention to perform, an action for
fraud will lie . . . has been rejected in Illinois"); Dennis v. Dennis, 132 Ill.
App. 2d 952,
271 N.E.2d 55 (3d Dist. 1971) (court dismissed promissory fraud action without considering
scheme or device exception). One federal case appears to have confused the scheme or device
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tion into the general rule to allow recovery in a promissory fraud action,
while still maintaining the fiction of two distinct legal principles. 4
Some Illinois courts adhere to the exception as the basis for recovery only
if the total facts reveal a scheme or device. These courts do not allow recovery
merely because a party made a false promise with no intention of keeping
it.' 9 This reluctance to allow recovery characterizes Illinois courts' continual
dissatisfaction with the scheme or device exception. Some courts have narrowed its application to the extent that it has become a virtually impossible
standard to satisfy.' 5 In yet another example of a court's uncertainty as
to how to apply the scheme or device exception, the court in Ochoa v.
Maloney'' held that no promissory fraud action at law existed, without any
mention of the scheme or device exception.' z In Ochoa, the plaintiffs alleged
that for a fee, defendant lawyers agreed to represent them in their criminal
appeal although they never actually intended to do so.'" Determining that
the plaintiffs had no basis for recovery, the Ochoa court declared:
Thus, they have alleged that defendants falsely promised to do something
in the future, which is not the basis for an action in fraud even though
accompanied by an intention not to perform. The mere fact that they also
alleged in the proposed pleading that they "believed in and justifiably relied
upon these representations" does not, in our opinion, alter the future
character of the promise. '
Thus, even a promise which the declarant arguably never intended to honor,

exception by suggesting that the exception to the normal rule against recovery in Illinois for
future or contingent events was the promissory fraud exception. See Peterson Indus., Inc. v.
Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank, 584 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1978) ("One such exception arises
when the statement is a 'false promise or representation of future conduct.'").
148. See Metropolitan Sanitary District v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 11. App. 3d 829, 841,
288 N.E.2d 905, 913 (1st Dist. 1972) (court noted that plaintiff admitted in its brief that even
though there was no cause of action for promissory fraud in Illinois, courts should allow such
an action as do other jurisdictions; appellate court responded that it was not its function to
initiate that change); Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 4 111.App. 3d 975, 978, 283
N.E.2d 62, 64 (1st Dist. 1972) (scheme or device exception was equated with a "carefully constructed plan of deceit").
149. Baker, Bourgeois & Assoc. v. Taylor, 84 111.App. 3d 909, 914, 410 N.E.2d 55, 59
(1st Dist. 1980) (plaintiff did not plead the existence of total facts to show a fraud scheme);
Shanahan v. Schindler, 63 11. App. 3d 82, 94, 379 N.E.2d 1307, 1316 (1st Dist. 1978) (total
facts did not reveal a scheme or device on which to base an action in fraud, even though
defendant's testimony revealed that the plaintiff made a promise without an intention of honoring
it); Zaborowski v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 43 111.App. 3d 21, 25, 356 N.E.2d 653, 656 (2d
Dist. 1976) (in dismissing promissory fraud action, the court stated that "[it is not enough,
however, that the party make a false promise not intending to keep it; the total facts must
show a scheme or device to defraud").
150. See, e.g., infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
151. 69 IlI. App. 3d 689, 387 N.E.2d 852 (lst Dist. 1979).
152. Id. at 695-96, 387 N.E.2d at 855-56.
153. Id. at 695, 387 N.E.2d at 856. The plaintiffs also alleged that the lawyers promised,
but never intended, to file a brief as well. Id.
154. Id. at 695-96, 387 N.E.2d at 856.
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made in the context of a fiduciary relationship, was insufficient to state a
cause of action under the scheme or device exception.'
Contrary to the Ochoa court, 5' 6 the Illinois appellate court in Pearson
v. Alexander"7 recently incorporated the exception into the general rule in
order to allow a plaintiff to base an action on promissory fraud. In Pearson, the defendant agreed to install a set of truck scales on the plaintiff's
farm by a certain date. The work, however, was not actually completed until many months later.' 58 The case was tried on claims of both breach of
contract and fraud because the defendant "knew, or should have reasonably
known that said representation was false and that he would be unable to
complete the installation" by that date.' 59 The trial court awarded compensatory damages on both the breach of contract and the fraud counts and
also awarded punitive damages on the fraud count.' 60 Due to evidentiary
problems, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely
155. Unlike state courts in Illinois, federal court3 applying Illinois law have been more willing to find that a scheme or device derived from a false promise states an action in fraud.
For instance, in Wilhoite v. Fastenware, 354 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. I11. 1973), an ex-employee
sued his former employer for fraud based on his employer's promise that he would be paid
10% of net sales, when in fact the employer had no intention of paying this rate of compensation. Id. at 858. In allowing the case to go to trial under the scheme or device exception,
the district court stated: "Certainly this standard places a substantial burden of proof upon
plaintiff, but mere problems of proof should not preclude him from attempting to sustain that
burden, however great." Id. Thus, while the scheme or device exception has only inconsistent
discretionary application in the state courts, the federal courts have allowed a plaintiff the
opportunity to recover under the scheme or device exception if the plaintiff could prove that
the defendant lacked the intention of keeping a promise when made.
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has refused to follow
the Illinois courts' refusal to allow an action for promissory fraud. For example, the Seventh
Circuit allowed recovery in deceit against an employer who falsely promised that an inventor
would be treated fairly if the inventor would transfer his patents to the employer. In so holding,
the Seventh Circuit declared:
Nor can it be successfully maintained that fraud may not under any circumstances
be based upon the nonperformance of promises. If such promises are made to induce the fraud, if they induce one to change his status to his damage, he may
seek the relief of one defrauded. It is only essential that the evidence disclose that
they were fraudulent in their inception, were made in bad faith, with the intention
to deceive and were the inducing cause of the detrimental change in his condition
made by the complaining party in reliance thereon.
Seimer v. James Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co., 299 F. 651, 657 (E.D. Ill. 1924), aff'd, 12
F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 700 (1926).
156. The Ochoa court held that reliance on a misrepresentation of a future act did not alter
the future characteristic of the promise. 69 111.App. 3d 689, 695-96, 387 N.E.2d 852, 856
(lst Dist. 1979). The Pearson court, however, extended the exception to cases in which the
purpose of the misrepresentation was to induce action by the plaintiff. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 112,
408 N.E.2d at 787. By extending the exception to include promises to do an act in the future,
the court narrowed the gap between Illinois and the majority of jurisdictions.
157. 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 408 N.E.2d 782 (4th Dist. 1980).
158. Id. at 1106-07, 408 N.E.2d at 783.
159. Id. at 1107, 408 N.E.2d at 783.
160. Id. at 1106, 408 N.E.2d at 783.
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on the issue of compensatory damages.'' Most importantly, the appellate
court affirmed the punitive damages award on the fraud count because the
court recognized that false promises alone are enough to constitute actionable
fraud.' 62 The court determined that the plaintiff could sue contemporaneously
for both fraud and breach of contract, when both causes of action arise
out of the same factual circumstances, without waiving any possible theory
of recovery.' 63 The court indicated that only when a party seeks contract
64
rescission may there be a possibility of waiver under the Illinois cases.'
Significantly, the court trenchantly abolished the scheme or device exception
by stating:
Distinguishing between the general rule in Illinois that a promise of future
conduct made without intention to perform is not misrepresentation and
the exception to the rule which makes such a promise a misrepresentation
if it is the scheme to accomplish a fraud, is not easy. As fraud occurs
when a misrepresentation is made with intent to induce a victim to rely
thereon and a victim is deceived and relies thereon to his detriment, such
misrepresentations are ordinarily the schemes by which the victim is
defrauded regardless of whether the misrepresentation is as to the declarant's
future intent or otherwise. Thus it would seem that the exception tends
to engulf and devour much of the general rule and lessen any disparity
between the Illinois rule and the majority rule as explained by Prosser.65
Nevertheless, even as recently as 1982, Illinois courts refused to accept the
majority rule of allowing recovery for promissory fraud. In Bank of Lincolnwood v. Comdisco, Inc., '6 the appellate court applied the Illinois rule
which disallows recovery for promissory fraud. In Comdisco, a bank sued
a borrower for breach of contract, restitution, and promissory fraud because
the borrower planned and schemed to benefit from the drop in interest rates
by renouncing the plaintiff's loan agreement after being unable to modify
the agreement.' 67 Although affirming the plaintiff's restitutory recovery for
breach of contract, the Comdisco court refused to allow recovery for the
promissory fraud under the scheme or device exception because the plaintiff
bank did not allege sufficient facts from which a scheme could be deduced.' 68
With these varying interpretations by the appellate courts on the viability
of an action based on promissory fraud, it is clear that only the Illinois
Supreme Court can effectively abolish the shell of a rule that still purports
to bar recovery for promissory fraud.
161. Id.

162. Id.at 1112, 408 N.E.2d at 787.
163. Id.;
see also Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 111.App. 3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975) (where both tort and contract causes of action arise out of same
fact situation, plaintiff is free to proceed with theory of his choice, and presence of cause

of action in contract does not preclude action based on tort), rev'd on other grounds, 64 II1.
2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
164. Pearson v. Alexander, 86 Il1. App. 3d at 1112, 408 N.E.2d at 787.
165. Id.
166. Il1Ill. App. 3d 822, 444 N.E.2d 657 (1st Dist. 1982).
167. Id.at 824, 444 N.E.2d at 659.
168. Id.at 829, 444 N.E.2d at 662.
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TIME FOR CHANGE

The judicial rationale for prohibiting promissory fraud actions in Illinois
rests on two interlocking arguments. The first is the implicit fear that promissory fraud will undermine the law of contracts. The second is the unarticulated suspicion that courts will be flooded with litigation in fraud when
no breach of contract action would lie. Both arguments, however, cannot
withstand rigorous scrutiny.
The argument that a promissory fraud action will erode the law of contracts contradicts the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which in several sections expressly authorizes the pleading of alternate and even inconsistent legal
theories.' 69 It is not inconsistent to assert that one has been damaged by
fraud as well as by breach of contract because both actions may well supplement each other.' 70 And, even though the Illinois Supreme Court in
Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School made it clear that promissory fraud
can exist when no contract action exists,'' Illinois courts have only tentatively accepted this principle. This reluctance is outdated and inappropriate
because there are different statutes of limitation, different rules of damages,
and different substantive elements as to the two legal theories. In addition,
it is unlikely that an action based on a fraudulent promise will devitalize
contract law because Illinois law already provides recovery under the modern
doctrine of promissory estoppel even in cases in which there is no classical
formation of a contract.' It is inconsistent and irrational that state policy
allows recovery for promissory estoppel on the very same promise for which
it will not allow recovery in promissory fraud as a matter of law. The promise that justifies reliance is the heart of the recovery whether one uses the
tort theory of promissory fraud or the nontort theory of promissory
estoppel."' The same promise is involved in either case, yet, Illinois courts
refuse to extend recovery to promissory fraud actions.
169. See supra notes 82, 84 & 85.
170. Illinois allows tort and contract causes of action to be tried in a single case when they
arise out of the same fact situation. See supra note 163. This essentially overrules Miller v.

Sutliff, 241 Ill. 521, 89 N.E. 651 (1909), where the court suggested that allowing an action
for fraud could destroy or seriously impair contract law. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 86.

172. See, e.g., Prueter v. Bork, 105 III. App. 3d 1003, 435 N.E.2d 109 (Ist Dist. 1982) (the
court did not consider allegations of breach of contract or promissory estoppel after it determined that defendant breached his fiduciary duty); Ill. Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. J.F. Edwards

Constr. Co., 90 Ill. App. 3d 768, 413 N.E.2d 209 (3d Dist. 1980) (court allowed recovery
on theory of promissory estoppel, a doctrine under which plaintiff may recover without the

presence of a contract); Perlin v. Board of Educ., 86 Ill. App. 3d 108, 407 N.E.2d 792 (1st
Dist. 1980) (court concluded that plaintiff had a valid claim for promissory estoppel, which
is "an unambiguous promise upon which the party making it can reasonably expect the other
to rely, followed by the second party's reliance resulting in his own injury").
173. Illinois courts, however, still recognize a legal distinction between the two theories. See,
e.g., Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 110 Ill.
App. 3d 492, 442 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1982) (where a bank promised to forego collection
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Illinois courts also consistently have held that a bare promise is sufficient
consideration for a contract even when the performance is a future event.' 74
It is reprehensible, therefore, for Illinois courts to hold that it is unacceptable to allow recovery for promissory fraud, the performance of which is
a future event, in a case in which the breach of the same bare promise would
be sufficient to sustain a contract action. Moreover, significant case precedent in Illinois allows relief in equity to those who parted with their home
or property in exchange for the duplicitous promise of lifelong support by
an artful deceiver or that of an ex-spouse.'" A fraud action is not any more
ruinous to the law of contracts than is cancellation or rescission of a deed
in equity. Either the promissory fraud justifies reliance in both situations
or it justifies reliance in neither. Finally, Illinois courts find no inconsistency in awarding a contract measure of damages in fraud cases. 7 6 Yet,
until negotiations ceased, court held that breach of the promise states a cause of action for
promissory estoppel but not for promissory fraud). But cf. Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co.,
31 Ill. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964) (employment promise was not a fact for purposes of
equitable estoppel and the oral contract was barred by the statute of frauds).
174. Courts have adhered to the rule that there is no failure of consideration where the
consideration is the promise to do an act in the future and the act is not performed. See,
e.g., Gage v. Lewis, 8 Ill. 604 (1873); Wilson v. Continental Body Corp., 93 Ill. App. 3d
966, 418 N.E.2d 56 (1981); Bogdan v. Ausema, 33 Ill. App. 2d 294, 179 N.E.2d 401 (1962);
Vella v. Pour, 329 Ill. App. 355, 68 N.E.2d 631 (1946); Conour v. Zimmerly, 290 II1. App.
546, 9 N.E.2d 61 (1937); Smysor v. Glasscock, 256 Ill. App. 29 (1930); Woodlawn Sec. Fin.
Corp. v. Doyle, 252 111.App. 68 (1929).
175. Markovits v. Markovits, 2 111.2d 303, 118 N.E.2d 255 (1954) (grounds for recission
established where conveyance of property was exchanged for a son's promise to aid in the
family business when, in fact, son had no intention of performing); Davids v. Davids, 333
Il1. 327, 164 N.E. 662 (1929) (fraud was established where mother conveyed property to son
based on son's promise to distribute shares to the children as the mother requested, although
the son had no intent of performing); DeCosta v. Bischer, 287 Ill. 598 (1919) (conveyance
of real estate was set aside for failure of consideration where grantee failed to support grantor); Stebbins v. Petty, 209 Ill. 291 (1904) (conveyance of real estate given for consideration
of life support, which grantee performed until she died but which her heirs refused to continue, was not grounds for rescission); Jones v. Neely, 72 111.449 (1874) (where consideration
of support for life was not performed, a rescinded deed justified a presumption of fraudulent
intent and abandonment of the contract); Frazier v. Miller, 16 Ill. 48 (1854) (plaintiff had
a valid claim in equity for rescission of a real estate conveyance where consideration of support
for life was not performed); Deahl v. Deahl, 13 111.App. 3d 150, 300 N.E.2d 497 (lst Dist.
1973) (husband had a cause of action for modification of divorce settlement which was based
on wife's intent not to remarry when in fact she intended to remarry immediately after the
divorce); Roth v. Roth, 45 111. 2d 19, 256 N.E.2d 838 (1970) (ex-husband had a valid claim
for modification of divorce settlement when it was based on wife's intent not to remarry, and
in fact she remarried 31 days after the divorce); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 79 Ill. App. 2d 194,
223 N.E.2d 461 (4th Dist. 1967) (where conveyance by husband to wife was made upon promise of wife to return and live with husband and to act as a good wife, and such promise
was not kept, conveyance was a nullity). But cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 257 Ill. App. 587 (1930)
(false promise to live with husband and to cor.summate the marriage was insufficient ground
for annulment); Bielby v. Bielby, 333 Ill. 478, 165 N.E. 231 (1929) (false promise to live with
husband and make a home for him was insufficient to annul the marriage).
176. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Del Vianco & Assoc. 57 I11. App. 3d 302, 372 N.E.2d
953 (1st Dist. 1978) (court properly awarded contract damages in action sounding in tort);
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once again, there is no evidence that an identical measure of damages both
under the tort theory and the contract theory will sap contract law of its
separate legal identity.
The related suspicion that the floodgates of litigation will be opened wide
if an action for promissory fraud exists also is indefensible. There is no
evidence that states which allow actions based on promissory fraud are
besieged by an unusual number of promissory fraud actions. One explanation for this lack of evidence is that it is typically far more difficult to prove
a promissory fraud action than a breach of contract action.'" The fear that
a plaintiff will blithely ignore a contract theory in favor of a promissory
fraud theory overlooks several stark realities. First, Illinois law requires that
fraud be pleaded specifically and with particularity.' 78 In addition, Illinois
courts regularly require that any fraud specifically alleged must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence, a burden that surpasses the normal
preponderance of the evidence requirement in civil cases.' 79 In contrast, contract actions need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0
A plaintiff in a promissory fraud theory must prove not only the fraud but
the scienter-that is, that the defendant knowingly or recklessly told an untruth, or at least that the defendant negligently made a false representation.' 8'
Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 111.App. 3d 339,
330 N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975) (both compensatory and punitive damages were awarded in
case involving claims on an insurance policy where defendants raised the defense that plaintiff's claim was excluded from coverage by clause which states that the policy does not cover
preexisting illness or conditions), rev'd on other grounds, 64 111.2d 338, 3,56 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
177. See, e.g., Knightsbridge Realty Partners v. Pace, 101 111.App. 3d 49, 427 N.E.2d 815
(1st Dist. 1981) (court avoided rule against promissory fraud and its scheme or device exception by adroitly finding a lack of justifiable reliance by the plaintiff); accord Redarowicz v.
Ohlendorf, 95 I11.App. 3d 444, 420 N.E.2d 209 (4th Dist. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 92 111.2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
178. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg v. Goldberg, 103 Ill. App.
3d 584, 431 N.E.2d 1060 (1981) ("To sustain unsupported allegations of a plan or scheme
as sufficient, as the Bank contends, would only invite this type of pleading every time multiple
parties, who are jointly obligated under a contract, elect not to perform."). Bank of Lincolnwood
v. Comdisco, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 822, 829, 444 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1st Dist. 1982).
179. See, e.g., Younger v. Revelle, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1, 397 N.E.2d 221 (5th Dist. 1979) (evidence
failed to prove that statements made about restaurant were more than puffing or boosting
not amounting to a statement of fact); Costello v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 I11. App. 3d
503, 348 N.E.2d 254 (lst Dist. 1976) (the evidence amply supported defendant's claim that
he did not engage in any fraud to induce employee to retire); Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp,
88 Ill. App. 2d 458, 232 N.E.2d 190 (1st Dist. 1967) (damages awarded where plaintiff proved
with clear and convincing evidence that defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations to induce plaintiff to sell stock at an inadequate price), rev'd on other grounds, 41 111.2d 215,
242 N.E.2d 228 (1968).
180. See, e.g., O'Neil & Santa Claus, Ltd. v. Xtra Value Imports, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d
1I, 365 N.E.2d 316 (3d Dist. 1977) (plaintiff failed to establish a preponderance of evidence
to support the existence of an oral contract); George F. Mueller & Sons v. Northern Ill. Gas
Co., 32 Ill. App. 3d 249, 336 N.E.2d 185 (1st Dist. 1975) (determination that plaintiff failed
to perform its contractual duties was not against the manifest weight of evidence).
181. See, e.g., Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill. App. 3d 37, 45, 390
N.E.2d 393, 401 (1st Dist. 1979) (scienter is met by proof that party knew or was unaware
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An action for breach of contract, however, does not require proof of a defendant's state of mind at the time of breach. Promissory fraud also requires
a showing of fault,' 82 while the breach of a contract case is a no-fault action; the issue in a breach of contract action is that performance has not

taken place, whether or not the promisor intended to perform.' 8 3 A plaintiff
who opts for the promissory fraud theory must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that at the very time of the promise, the promisor had

no intention of ever performing.'" Since such an intent cannot be inferred
from the mere breach by the promisor," 5 proof of the intent by clear and

convincing evidence is not likely to be common. Lastly, the statute of limitations in Illinois is longer for a written contract action than for a fraud action, while the same period of limitations exists for an action based on an
oral contract and on fraud.' 86 This is another disincentive for plaintiffs who

dream of using a promissory fraud theory to obviate a contract cause of
action. Thus, it is unlikely that plaintiffs will attempt to manipulate a contract action into a promissory fraud action simply because the plaintiff's
lawyer is barred by the contract statute of limitations. Although it is true
that punitive damages are recoverable in a fraud action,' 7 and doctrines
such as the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds may be avoided

with a promissory fraud theory,

8

those advantages, even if obtainable, are

offset by the difficulty of proving the legal elements peculiar to a fraud
action.
It is illogical and unrealistic to suggest that fraud covers only physical
facts and not psychological facts. Although one cannot generally recover

in fraud for vague and indefinite present opinions,' 9 modern courts allow
recovery against one who falsely represents an opinion as a fact or who
represents that he holds a particular opinion when in fact he never held such

an opinion.'8I A man's state of mind, which is often an element of a crime
of the truthfulness of the representations; in the instant case, defendant knew whether or not
he owned the equipment); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 III. 2d 54, 62-68, 250 N.E.2d 656, 660-63
(1969) (defendant's knowledge that his survey would be relied on by others was sufficient to
meet the scienter requirement).
182. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 180.
184. See supra note 179.
185. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
186. The limitation period is ten years for written contracts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 17;
five years for oral contracts and five years for fraud as a civil action "not otherwise provided
for," id. § 16. See Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560, 402 N.E.2d 181,
184 (1980); accord Munsterman v. Illinois Agric. Auditing Ass'n., 106 Ill. App. 3d 237, 435
N.E.2d 923 (1982).
187. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
188. The courts are split on the question of whether actions barred by lack of consideration,
illegality, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, parol evidence, or disclaimer under contract
theory are necessarily barred under a promissory fraud theory. W. PROSSER, supra note 23,
§ 109, at 729-30.
189. See supra notes 179 and 181.
190. See supra notes 28.
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or a tort, is a factual element of proof. To hold that a promise is in no
sense a present or past fact leads to arbitrary results.' 9' The community,
moreover, knows that a promise is as much a fact as is any other representation, and that, realistically, men of good sense and intelligence are likely
to rely on a promise which is reasonably within the promisor's control. To
allow a deceiver to escape liability merely because his statement is characterized as a promise rather than as a misrepresentation is unconscionable. Many
Illinois cases imply an even more untenable position by distinguishing between a promise of something to be done in the future, which is not actionable, and a misrepresentation of a nonpromissory matter which is to
'
occur in the future, which is actionable in fraud. 92
The continuation of the ambiguities in Illinois law that result from the
general rule of nonrecovery for promissory fraud, coupled with an exception when the promise is the scheme or device of the fraud, allows a trial
court to do virtually what it pleases without any reasoned guidance. This
unbridled discretion, in the guise of a legal rule accompanied by an ambiguous exception, arises because the exception logically destroys the major
premise of nonrecovery and, thus, allows the trial court to cite either the
rule or its exception with equal rationale. It would be useless to limit the
exception to situations in which there is other fraud in addition to the promissory fraud. The proper alternative for Illinois courts is to recognize an
action for promissory fraud whenever the demanding elements of a typical
fraud action are met.' 9 The most direct way to deal with this fossil law
is to bury it. To salvage vestiges of an invalidated legal principle such as
this will further exacerbate the lack of an intelligible principle in promissory
fraud cases. The rule against recovery for promissory fraud must be changed
and Illinois must follow the trend of its sister states'94 by allowing promissory
fraud both as a cause of action and as a defense.
191. See, e.g., Reimer v. Leshtz, 90 111. App. 3d 980, 444 N.E.2d 114 (Ist Dist. 1980). The
plaintiffs in Reimer had a cause of action against the defendant because defendant seller
represented that her home did not and would not leak. According to the court, "it is apparent
from the complaint that plaintiffs at the time of inspection were not seeking an express assurance
that the home would not leak in the future although they might have desired such an assurance."
Id. at 983, 414 N.E.2d at 116.
192. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill. App. 2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89 (2d Dist. 1965) (court
held that to state a cause of action in common law fraud, the party must allege that: (1) the
statement made was of material fact as opposed to opinion; (2) that it was untrue; (3) that
the the party making the statement knew or believed it to be untrue; (4) that the opposing
party believed and relied on it and had a right to do so; (5) that the statement was made
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) that the other party's reliance thereon
led to his injury); see also supra note 2.
194. See supra note 28.

